Complementarity, Substituability and Capital Accumulation
The preemptive role of capital is analysed in a class of two-player symmetric capital accumulation differential games with reversible investment. It is proved that, in the medium run, the firm with better initial condition exploits its advantage when the game features feedback substituability. Indeed the feedback as well as the open loop Nash equilibria yield an overshooting with respect to the long run steady state for the capital stock of the advantaged firm.
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|Date of creation:||1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: G.R.E.Q.A.M., (GROUPE DE RECHERCHE EN ECONOMIE QUANTITATIVE D'AIX MARSEILLE), CENTRE DE VIEILLE CHARITE, 2 RUE DE LA CHARITE, 13002 MARSEILLE.|
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