Compravendita o Donazione di Parti del Corpo Umano? Il Contributo di Alvin Roth e Dintorni
This article discusses Alvin Roth’s research about moneyless markets, and in particular about the manner in which kidneys are allocated to patients needing transplants. As Titmuss pointed out for blood transfusions, providing monetary incentives to blood donors may crowd out supply, since external rewards may crowd out intrinsic motivation. On the contrary, Roth argues than non-monetary but extrinsic incentives may have a positive effect on pro-social behavior without needing altruism. Developing Roth’s approach, this article analyzes what money cannot, and what should not, buy.
|Date of creation:||2014|
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