Information Disclosure in Procurement Auctions with Horizontally Differentiated Suppliers
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Other versions of this item:
- Domenico Colucci & Nicola Doni & Vincenzo Valori, 2011. "Information Disclosure in Procurement Auctions with Horizontally Differentiated Suppliers," Working Papers - Mathematical Economics 2011-02, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
References listed on IDEAS
- Esther Gal-Or & Mordechai Gal-Or & Anthony Dukes, 2007. "Optimal information revelation in procurement schemes," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(2), pages 400-418, June.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Nicola Doni & Domenico Menicucci, 2014.
"Information Revelation in Procurement Auctions with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(4), pages 952-968, December.
- Nicola Doni & Domenico Menicucci, 2011. "Information revelation in procurement auctions with two-sided asymmetric information," Working Papers - Economics wp2011_14.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
- Colucci, Domenico & Doni, Nicola & Valori, Vincenzo, 2012.
"Preferential treatment in procurement auctions through information revelation,"
Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 883-886.
- Domenico Colucci & Nicola Doni & Vincenzo Valori, 2012. "Preferential treatment in procurement auctions through information revelation," Working Papers - Mathematical Economics 2012-06, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
- Stoll, Sebastian & Zöttl, Gregor, 2014. "Transparency in Buyer-Determined Auctions: Should Quality be Private or Public?," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 459, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Stoll, Sebastian & Zöttl, Gregor, 2012. "Information Disclosure in Open Non-Binding Procurement Auctions: an Empirical Study," Discussion Papers in Economics 13112, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Stoll, Sebastian & Zöttl, Gregor, 2012. "Information Disclosure in Dynamic Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions: An Empirical Study," Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62044, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
More about this item
Keywordsmultidimensional auctions; procurement policies; endogenous information; horizontal di¤erentiation; asymmetric auctions.;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2011-02-05 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-IND-2011-02-05 (Industrial Organization)
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