Firms as clubs in Walrasian markets with private information : technical appendix
This paper proves the Welfare Theorems and the existence of a competitive equilibrium for the club economies with private information in Prescott and Townsend (2005). The proofs cover lottery economies with a finite number of goods and without free disposal. A mapping based on Negishi (1960) is used.
|Date of creation:||2005|
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- Edward Simpson Prescott & Robert M. Townsend, 2000.
"Firms as clubs in Walrasian markets with private information,"
00-08, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Edward Simpson Prescott & Robert M. Townsend, 2006. "Firms as Clubs in Walrasian Markets with Private Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(4), pages 644-671, August.
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