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The Crowding-In Effects of Local Government Debt in China

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We study how changes in the composition of Chinese local government debt influenced bank risk taking, credit allocation, and local productivity. Using confidential loan-level data and a difference-in-difference identification approach, we show that a debt-to-bond swap program for local governments implemented in 2015 significantly increased bank risk taking through a risk-weighting channel under Basel III capital regulations. The debt swap program converted bank holdings of municipal corporate debt to local government bonds, reducing banks’ risk-weighted assets. Banks responded by lowering credit spreads on loans to privately owned firms (POEs) relative to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), with significantly larger reductions in POE credit spreads in provinces with more outstanding government debt. Furthermore, the credit reallocation toward more productive private firms—a crowding in effect of the debt swap—significantly raised local productivity.

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  • Xiaoming Li & Zheng Liu & Yuchao Peng & Zhiwei Xu, 2024. "The Crowding-In Effects of Local Government Debt in China," Working Paper Series 2024-35, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedfwp:99080
    DOI: 10.24148/wp2024-35
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    1. Mathias Hoffmann & Iryna Stewen & Michael Stiefel, 2021. "Growing Like Germany: Local Public Debt, Local Banks, Low Private Investment," Working Papers 2103, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz.
    2. Qu, Xi & Xu, Zhiwei & Yu, Jinxiang & Zhu, Jun, 2023. "Understanding local government debt in China: A regional competition perspective," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    3. Manuel Adelino & Igor Cunha & Miguel A. Ferreira, 2017. "The Economic Effects of Public Financing: Evidence from Municipal Bond Ratings Recalibration," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 30(9), pages 3223-3268.
    4. John, Teresa A & John, Kose, 1993. "Top-Management Compensation and Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(3), pages 949-974, July.
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    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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