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Fiscal policy in monetary unions: implications for Europe

Author

Listed:
  • Reuven Glick
  • Michael M. Hutchison

Abstract

This paper analyzes how the feasible mix of government expenditure and financing arrangements may change with the establishment of a monetary union such as that planned by members of the European Community. We find that a monetary union reduces the feasible divergence across countries in their present discounted levels of fiscal spending. Wide differences across countries in their present and future time pattern of spending are still possible, however. Examination of the empirical evidence suggests that the movement towards greater exchange rate fixity associated with the EMS and participation in \"quasi\" monetary unions have not been accompanied by significant fiscal convergence. The experience of member states of several existing monetary unions, however, suggests that a more effective constraint to budgetary discipline arises within full-fledged unions in operation over long periods even in the absence of binding central rules on government deficit and debt positions.

Suggested Citation

  • Reuven Glick & Michael M. Hutchison, 1992. "Fiscal policy in monetary unions: implications for Europe," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 92-02, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedfap:92-02
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    Cited by:

    1. Thierry Warin, 2004. "Should Europe Get Rid of the Stability and Growth Pact?," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0415, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
    2. repec:kap:iaecre:v:11:y:2005:i:1:p:29-38 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Joseph Daniels & David VanHoose, 1998. "Two-Country Models of Monetary and Fiscal Policy: What Have We Learned? What More Can We Learn?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 265-284, July.
    4. Jeffrey A. Frankel, 2016. "International Coordination," NBER Working Papers 21878, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Paweł Młodkowski, 2006. "Konwergencja fiskalna w uniach walutowych w Afryce na tle rozwiązań europejskich," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 1-2, pages 19-36.
    6. Młodkowski, Paweł, . "Konwergencja fiskalna w uniach walutowych w Afryce na tle rozwiązań europejskich," Gospodarka Narodowa-The Polish Journal of Economics, Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie / SGH Warsaw School of Economics, vol. 2006(1-2).
    7. Kocenda, Evzen & Kutan, Ali M. & Yigit, Taner M., 2008. "Fiscal convergence in the European Union," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 319-330, December.
    8. Mr. Anthony J. Pellechio & Saqib Rizavi & Phebby Kufa, 2003. "Fiscal Sustainability and Policy Issues in the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union," IMF Working Papers 2003/162, International Monetary Fund.
    9. Maurice Obstfeld, 1997. "Europe's Gamble," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 28(2), pages 241-317.
    10. Alesina, Alberto Francesco, 1997. "Comments on 'Europe's Gamble' by M. Obstfeld," Scholarly Articles 12553725, Harvard University Department of Economics.

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