Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many Players
Interpret a set of players all playing the same pure strategy and all with similar attributes as a society. Is it consistent with self interested behaviour for a population to organise itself into a relatively small number of societies? In a companion paper we characterised how large e must be, in terms of parameters describing individual games, for an equilibrium to exhibit conformity in pure strategies. In this paper we provide a wide class of games where such conformity is boundedly rational, that is, where can be chosen to be small.
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- Ehud Kalai, 2001. "Ex-Post Stability in Large Games," Discussion Papers 1351, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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