Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many Players
Interpret a set of players all playing the same pure strategy and all with similar attributes as a society. Is it consistent with self interested behaviour for a population to organise itself into a relatively small number of societies? In a companion paper we characterised how large e must be, in terms of parameters describing individual games, for an equilibrium to exhibit conformity in pure strategies. In this paper we provide a wide class of games where such conformity is boundedly rational, that is, where can be chosen to be small.
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- Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2009.
"On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 137-153, March.
- Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2003. "On Equilibrium in Pure Strategies in Games with Many Players," Working Papers 2003.122, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Cartwright, Edward & Wooders, Myrna, 2003. "On Equilibrium in Pure Stategies in Games with Many Players," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 686, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2005. "On Equilibrium in Pure Strategies in Games with Many Players," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0511, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Ehud Kalai, 2001. "Ex-Post Stability in Large Games," Discussion Papers 1351, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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