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Groups, commons and regulations: Experiments with villagers and students in colombia

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  • Juan-Camilo Cardenas

Abstract

Group externalities imply a situation where individual and group interests are not aligned and therefore require the design of rules or institutions that correct the failure in order to improve social outcomes. Public goods, team work, the use of natural resources under joint access, or any pollution problems, are examples of such potential divergence between individual and group incentives. Institutional corrections can come exogenously from a regulatory state that brings in command and control or incentive mechanisms (pecuniary or not-pecuniary), or that reassigns property rights to correct the failure. But solutions can also emerge endogenously from the group, through self-governed institutions, with similar mechanisms of material or non-material incentives, as well as social norms or conventions.
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  • Juan-Camilo Cardenas, 2005. "Groups, commons and regulations: Experiments with villagers and students in colombia," Artefactual Field Experiments 00026, The Field Experiments Website.
  • Handle: RePEc:feb:artefa:00026
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    Cited by:

    1. Maria Claudia Lopez & James J. Murphy & John M. Spraggon & John K. Stranlund, 2013. "Does government regulation complement existing community efforts to support cooperation? Evidence from field experiments in Colombia," Chapters, in: John A. List & Michael K. Price (ed.), Handbook on Experimental Economics and the Environment, chapter 12, pages 346-366, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polania-Reyes, 2011. "Economic incentives and social preferences: substitutes or complements?," Department of Economics University of Siena 617, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    3. Jon Anderson & Stephen Burks & Jeffrey Carpenter & Lorenz Götte & Karsten Maurer & Daniele Nosenzo & Ruth Potter & Kim Rocha & Aldo Rustichini, 2013. "Self-selection and variations in the laboratory measurement of other-regarding preferences across subject pools: evidence from one college student and two adult samples," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(2), pages 170-189, June.
    4. Slonim, Robert & Wang, Carmen & Garbarino, Ellen & Merrett, Danielle, 2013. "Opting-in: Participation bias in economic experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 43-70.
    5. Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polania-Reyes, 2012. "Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or Complements?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 50(2), pages 368-425, June.
    6. Velez, Maria Alejandra & Stranlund, John K. & Murphy, James J., 2012. "Preferences for government enforcement of a common pool harvest quota: Theory and experimental evidence from fishing communities in Colombia," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 185-192.
    7. Ibanez, Marcela & Martinsson, Peter, 2008. "Can we do policy recommendations from a framed field experiment? The case of coca cultivation in Colombia," Working Papers in Economics 306, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    8. Davide Dragone & Fabio Galeotti & Raimondello Orsini, 2015. "Students, Temporary Workers and Co-Op Workers: An Experimental Investigation on Social Preferences," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(2), pages 1-45, May.
    9. Juan Camilo Cardenas & Luz Angela Rodríguez & Nancy Johnson, 2014. "Vertical Collective Action: Addressing Vertical Asymmetries in Watershed Management," Documentos CEDE 12608, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    10. Slonim, Robert & Wang, Carmen & Garbarino, Ellen & Merrett, Danielle, 2012. "Opting-In: Participation Biases in the Lab," IZA Discussion Papers 6865, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    11. Castillo, Daniel & Bousquet, François & Janssen, Marco A. & Worrapimphong, Kobchai & Cardenas, Juan Camillo, 2011. "Context matters to explain field experiments: Results from Colombian and Thai fishing villages," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(9), pages 1609-1620, July.

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