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Game Theoretic Models of Wage Bargaining

Author

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  • Manzini, P.

Abstract

Rather than a complete survey, this paper aims at being a tool to help apply game theoretic bergaining models to wage negotiations. In this perspective we review a number of articles which explicitly deal with wage determination as well as purely game theoretical models which we believe can be fruitfully extended to account for specific features of labour markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Manzini, P., 1996. "Game Theoretic Models of Wage Bargaining," Discussion Papers 9615, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:exe:wpaper:9615
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    Cited by:

    1. Gersbach, Hans & Schniewind, Achim, 2001. "Awareness of General Equilibrium Effects and Unemployment," IZA Discussion Papers 394, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    2. Paul Heidhues, 2000. "Employers’ Associations, Industry-wide Unions, and Competition," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-11, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
    3. Hessel Oosterbeek & Randolph Sloof & Joep Sonnemans, 2007. "Who should invest in specific training?," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 20(2), pages 329-357, April.
    4. Drakopoulos, Stavros A. & Katselidis, Ioannis, 2012. "The Development of Trade Union theory and Mainstream Economic Methodology," MPRA Paper 39239, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    BARGAINING; WAGES;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

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