Game Theoretic Models of Wage Bargaining
This paper aims at being a tool to help apply game theoretic bargaining models to wage negotiations. In this perspective, we review a number of articles which explicitly deal with wage determination as well as purely game theoretical models which we believe can be fruitfully extended to account for specific features of labour markets. We discuss some common shortcomings in the wage negotiation literature, and suggest possible lines of research worth pursuing to deal with such weaknesses. Copyright 1998 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd
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Volume (Year): 12 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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