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Taxation of nuclear rents: benfits, drawbacks and alternatives


  • Pieter HIMPENS
  • Joris MORBEE
  • Stef PROOST


The taxation of nuclear energy is studied using a stylized model of the electricity sector, with one dominant nuclear producer and a competitive fringe of fossil-fuel plants. We show that an unanticipated tax on nuclear production can generate significant government revenue in the short run without disturbing the market, but will harm investment incentives in the long run, especially if the government cannot credibly commit to a future tax rate. Even if the government is capable of credibly committing to an optimal long-run tax, government revenues from the long-run tax will be very low due to the market power of the incumbent. Lifetime extension agreements negotiated with multiple potential players, and competitive auctioning of new nuclear licenses are shown to be the most attractive policies. The analytical results are illustrated with a numerical simulation for the case of Belgium.

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  • Pieter HIMPENS & Joris MORBEE & Stef PROOST, 2011. "Taxation of nuclear rents: benfits, drawbacks and alternatives," Working Papers Department of Economics ces11.16, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces11.16

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    JEL classification:

    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • Q41 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy

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