Taxation of nuclear rents: benfits, drawbacks and alternatives
The taxation of nuclear energy is studied using a stylized model of the electricity sector, with one dominant nuclear producer and a competitive fringe of fossil-fuel plants. We show that an unanticipated tax on nuclear production can generate significant government revenue in the short run without disturbing the market, but will harm investment incentives in the long run, especially if the government cannot credibly commit to a future tax rate. Even if the government is capable of credibly committing to an optimal long-run tax, government revenues from the long-run tax will be very low due to the market power of the incumbent. Lifetime extension agreements negotiated with multiple potential players, and competitive auctioning of new nuclear licenses are shown to be the most attractive policies. The analytical results are illustrated with a numerical simulation for the case of Belgium.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +32-(0)16-32 67 25
Fax: +32-(0)16-32 67 96
Web page: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/ew
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces11.16. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Karla Vander Weyden)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.