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The kind of silence: managing a reputation for voluntary disclosure in financial markets

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  • Gietzmann, Miles
  • Ostaszewski, Adam

Abstract

We create a continuous-time setting in which to investigate how the management of a firm controls a dynamic choice between two generic voluntary disclosure decision rules (strategies) in the period between two consecutive mandatory disclosure dates: one with full and transparent disclosure termed candid, the other, termed sparing, under which values only above a dynamic threshold are disclosed. We show how parameters of the model such as news intensity, pay-for-performance and time-to-mandatory-disclosure determine the optimal choice of candid versus sparing strategies and the optimal times for management to switch between the two. The model presented develops a number of insights, based on a very simple ordinary differential equation characterizing equilibrium in a piecewise-deterministic model, derivable from the background Black–Scholes model and Poisson arrival of signals of firm value. It is shown that in equilibrium when news intensity is low a firm may employ a candid disclosure strategy throughout, but will otherwise switch (alternate) between periods of being candid and periods of being sparing with the truth (or the other way about). Significantly, with constant pay-for-performance parameters, at most one switching can occur.

Suggested Citation

  • Gietzmann, Miles & Ostaszewski, Adam, 2023. "The kind of silence: managing a reputation for voluntary disclosure in financial markets," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118554, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:118554
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    File URL: https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/118554/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Viral V. Acharya & Peter DeMarzo & Ilan Kremer, 2011. "Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 2955-2979, December.
    2. Bertomeu, Jeremy & Marinovic, Iván & Terry, Stephen J. & Varas, Felipe, 2022. "The dynamics of concealment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 227-246.
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    Cited by:

    1. Miles B. Gietzmann & Adam J. Ostaszewski, 2024. "Damages and Materiality: Effects on voluntary disclosure," Papers 2410.13878, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2026.
    2. Seung Y. Lee & Iván Marinovic, 2025. "Dynamic Information Acquisition, Investment, and Disclosure," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 63(4), pages 1547-1581, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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