IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ecl/stabus/2026.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Meaning(s) of Happiness

Author

Listed:
  • Kamvar, Sep

    (Stanford University)

  • Mogilner, Cassie

    (Stanford University)

  • Aaker, Jennifer

    (Stanford University)

Abstract

An examination of emotions reported on 12 million personal blogs along with the results of three experiments reveal that the meaning of happiness is not fixed; instead, it shifts as people age. Whereas younger people are more likely to associate happiness with excitement, older people are more likely to associate happiness with feeling peaceful. This change is driven by increased feelings of connectedness (to others and to the present moment) as one ages.

Suggested Citation

  • Kamvar, Sep & Mogilner, Cassie & Aaker, Jennifer, 2009. "The Meaning(s) of Happiness," Research Papers 2026, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:2026
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP2026.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mailath, George J & Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M, 1993. "Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 273-302.
    2. Srihari Govindan & Jean-François Mertens, 2004. "An equivalent definition of stable Equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 339-357.
    3. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2002. "Maximal stable sets of two-player games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 557-566.
    4. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2009. "On Forward Induction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 1-28.
    5. Wilson, Robert B. & Govindan, Srihari, 2006. "Sufficient conditions for stable equilibria," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, pages 167-206.
    6. Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1992. "The small worlds axiom for stable equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 553-564.
    7. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2009. "Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Two Players, Perfect Information, and Generic Payoffs," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000125, David K. Levine.
    8. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert, 2001. "Direct Proofs of Generic Finiteness of Nash Equilibrium Outcomes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 765-769.
    9. Jean-François Mertens, 1989. "Stable Equilibria---A Reformulation," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 14(4), pages 575-625, November.
    10. Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 627-649.
    11. Reny Philip J., 1993. "Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 257-274.
    12. Van Damme, Eric, 2002. "Strategic equilibrium," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 41, pages 1521-1596 Elsevier.
    13. Philip J. Reny, 1992. "Rationality in Extensive-Form Games," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, pages 103-118.
    14. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2008. "Metastable Equilibria," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(4), pages 787-820, November.
    15. van Damme, E.E.C., 1984. "A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games," Other publications TiSEM 3734d89e-fd5c-4c80-a230-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    16. Wilson, Robert B. & Govindan, Srihari, 2006. "Sufficient conditions for stable equilibria," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, pages 167-206.
    17. Srihari Govindan & Tilman Klumpp, 2003. "Perfect equilibrium and lexicographic beliefs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 229-243.
    18. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 1003-1037.
    19. Koller, Daphne & Megiddo, Nimrod, 1992. "The complexity of two-person zero-sum games in extensive form," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 528-552.
    20. Reny Philip J., 1993. "Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 257-274.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Piper, Alan T., 2015. "Sliding down the U-shape? A dynamic panel investigation of the age-well-being relationship, focusing on young adults," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, pages 54-61.
    2. Adorée Durayappah, 2011. "The 3P Model: A General Theory of Subjective Well-Being," Journal of Happiness Studies, Springer, pages 681-716.
    3. Prince Adjei & Frank Agyei, 2015. "Biodiversity, environmental health and human well-being: analysis of linkages and pathways," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, pages 1085-1102.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:2026. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/gsstaus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.