Audits as Signals
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- repec:eee:jeeman:v:84:y:2017:i:c:p:62-83 is not listed on IDEAS
- Kotowski, Maciej H. & Weisbach, David A. & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2014. "Signaling with Audits: Mimicry, Wasteful Expenditures, and Non-compliance in a Model of Tax Enforcement," Working Paper Series rwp14-001, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
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NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2013-10-18 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2013-10-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2013-10-18 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-IUE-2013-10-18 (Informal & Underground Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2013-10-18 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2013-10-18 (Regulation)
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