A Note on Moral Hazard and Linear Compensation Schemes
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- Xiao Yu Wang, 2014. "Risk Sorting, Portfolio Choice, and Endogenous Informal Insurance," NBER Working Papers 20429, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Keywordsprincipal agent problems; moral hazard; linear incentive schemes; insurance; incentives;
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-12-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2013-12-29 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2013-12-29 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HRM-2013-12-29 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-UPT-2013-12-29 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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