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Market Discipline through Credit Ratings and Too‐Big‐to‐Fail in Banking

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  • Kolaric, Sascha
  • Kiesel, Florian
  • Ongena, Steven

Abstract

Do credit ratings help enforce market discipline on banks? Analyzing a uniquely comprehensive data set consisting of 1,081 rating change announcements for 154 international financial institutions between January 2004 and December 2015, we find that rating downgrades for internal reasons, such as adverse changes in the operating performance or capital structure of banks, are associated with a significant credit default swap spread widening. However, this widening only occurs for banks that are not perceived as to be Too‐Big‐to‐Fail (TBTF). Our findings question the reliability of credit ratings as a tool to discipline TBTF banks and suggest that regulatory monitoring should remain the main mechanism for disciplining these banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Kolaric, Sascha & Kiesel, Florian & Ongena, Steven, 2025. "Market Discipline through Credit Ratings and Too‐Big‐to‐Fail in Banking," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) 157321, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL).
    • Handle: RePEc:dar:wpaper:157321
    DOI: 10.1111/jmcb.12789
    Note: for complete metadata visit http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/157321/
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    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Klein, Philipp & Maidl, Christoph & Woyand, Corinna, 2021. "Bank ownership and capital buffers: How internal control is affected by external governance," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    3. Yusifzada, Leyla, 2025. "How does subordinated debt affect the cost of capital for banks?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    4. Tölö, Eero & Jokivuolle, Esa & Viren, Matti, 2019. "Has banks' monitoring of other banks strengthened post-crisis? Evidence from the European overnight market," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 22/2019, Bank of Finland.
    5. Florian Kiesel, 2021. "It's the tone, stupid! Soft information in credit rating reports and financial markets," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 44(3), pages 553-585, September.
    6. Riccardo Ferretti & Giovanni Gallo & Andrea Landi & Valeria Venturelli, 2018. "Market-Book Ratios of European Banks: What Does Explain the Structural Fall?," Centro Studi di Banca e Finanza (CEFIN) (Center for Studies in Banking and Finance) 0065, Universita di Modena e Reggio Emilia, Dipartimento di Economia "Marco Biagi".
    7. Daniela Arzu & Marcella Lucchetta & Guido Max Mantovani, 2021. "Catch the Heterogeneity: The New Bank-Tailored Integrated Rating," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(7), pages 1-25, July.
    8. Riccardo Ferretti & Giovanni Gallo & Andrea Landi & Valeria Venturelli, 2018. "Market-Book Ratios of European Banks: What Does Explain the Structural Fall?," Centro Studi di Banca e Finanza (CEFIN) (Center for Studies in Banking and Finance) 18011, Universita di Modena e Reggio Emilia, Dipartimento di Economia "Marco Biagi".

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

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