IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cwl/cwldpp/2377.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Taxing Externalities Without Hurting the Poor

Author

Listed:
  • Mallesh Pai

    (Rice University)

  • Philipp Strack

    (Yale University)

Abstract

We consider the optimal taxation of a good which exhibits a negative externality, in a setting where agents differ in their value for the good, their disutility from the externality, and their value for money, while the planner observes neither. Pigouvian taxation is the unique Pareto efficient mechanism, yet it is only optimal if the planner puts higher Pareto weights on richer agents. We derive the optimal tax schedule for both a narrow allocative objective and a utilitarian objective for the planner. The optimal tax is generically nonlinear, and Pareto inefficient. The optimal mechanism might take a Ònon-marketÓ form and cap consumption, or forbid it altogether. We illustrate the tractability of our model by deriving closed form solutions for the lognormal and Rayleigh distribution. Finally, we calibrate our model and derive optimal taxes for the case of air travel.

Suggested Citation

  • Mallesh Pai & Philipp Strack, 2022. "Taxing Externalities Without Hurting the Poor," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2377, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2377
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2024-02/d2377.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Casey Rothschild & Florian Scheuer, 2016. "Optimal Taxation with Rent-Seeking," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(3), pages 1225-1262.
    2. Condorelli, Daniele, 2013. "Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 582-591.
    3. Peter A. Diamond, 1973. "Consumption Externalities and Imperfect Corrective Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 4(2), pages 526-538, Autumn.
    4. Severin Borenstein & Lucas W. Davis, 2016. "The Distributional Effects of US Clean Energy Tax Credits," Tax Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 191-234.
    5. Fabian Herweg & Klaus M Schmidt, 2022. "How to Regulate Carbon Emissions with Climate-Conscious Consumers," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(648), pages 2992-3019.
    6. Paul Milgrom & Ilya Segal, 2002. "Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 583-601, March.
    7. Piotr Dworczak, 2022. "Equity-efficiency trade-off in quasi-linear environments," GRAPE Working Papers 70, GRAPE Group for Research in Applied Economics.
    8. Antoine Ferey & Benjamin Lockwood & Dmitry Taubinsky, 2021. "Sufficient Statistics for Nonlinear Tax Systems with General Across-Income Heterogeneity," NBER Working Papers 29582, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, 1997. "Environmental Taxes and the Double Dividends Hypothesis: Did You Really Expect Something for Nothing?," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 9706, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
    10. Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2001. "Direct versus Indirect Taxation: The Design of the Tax Structure Revisted," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(3), pages 781-799, August.
    11. James M. Sallee, 2019. "Pigou Creates Losers: On the Implausibility of Achieving Pareto Improvements from Efficiency-Enhancing Policies," NBER Working Papers 25831, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Saez, Emmanuel, 2002. "The desirability of commodity taxation under non-linear income taxation and heterogeneous tastes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 217-230, February.
    13. Hunt Allcott & Christopher Knittel & Dmitry Taubinsky, 2015. "Tagging and Targeting of Energy Efficiency Subsidies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(5), pages 187-191, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Griffith, Rachel & O’Connell, Martin & Smith, Kate, 2019. "Tax design in the alcohol market," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 20-35.
    2. John T. Revesz, 2014. "A computational model of optimal commodity taxation," Public Finance Research Papers 4, Istituto di Economia e Finanza, DSGE, Sapienza University of Rome.
    3. Rachel Griffith & Martin O'Connell & Kate Smith, 2017. "Design of optimal corrective taxes in the alcohol market," IFS Working Papers W17/02, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    4. John T. Revesz, 2014. "A Numerical Model of Optimal Differentiated Indirect Taxation," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 211(4), pages 9-66, December.
    5. Eduardo Dávila & Ansgar Walther, 2021. "Corrective Regulation with Imperfect Instruments," NBER Working Papers 29160, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Violeta Vulovic & Yongzheng Liu, 2011. "Direct versus Indirect Taxation: Trends, Theory, and Economic Significance," Chapters, in: Emilio Albi & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (ed.), The Elgar Guide to Tax Systems, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Jacobs, Bas & van der Ploeg, Frederick, 2019. "Redistribution and pollution taxes with non-linear Engel curves," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 198-226.
    8. Stefanie Stantcheva, 2015. "Learning and (or) Doing: Human Capital Investments and Optimal Taxation," NBER Working Papers 21381, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, 2012. "Optimal Labor Income Taxation," NBER Working Papers 18521, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. OBARA, Takuya, 2018. "Optimal human capital policies under the endogenous choice of educational types," CCES Discussion Paper Series 66_v2, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    11. Naito, Hisahiro, 2004. "Endogenous human capital accumulation, comparative advantage and direct vs. indirect redistribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2685-2710, December.
    12. Casey Rothschild & Florian Scheuer, 2016. "Optimal Taxation with Rent-Seeking," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(3), pages 1225-1262.
    13. Julien Daubanes & Pierre Lasserre, 2011. "Optimum Commodity Taxation with a Non-Renewable Resource," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 11/151, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    14. Fleurbaey, Marc, 2006. "Is commodity taxation unfair?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(10-11), pages 1765-1787, November.
    15. Florian Scheuer & Joel Slemrod, 2021. "Taxing Our Wealth," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 35(1), pages 207-230, Winter.
    16. Francesca Parodi, 2023. "Taxation of Consumption and Labor Income: A Quantitative Approach," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 177-216, October.
    17. Eduardo Dávila, 2023. "Optimal Financial Transaction Taxes," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 78(1), pages 5-61, February.
    18. Renato Gomes & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur & Alessandro Pavan, 2018. "Differential Taxation and Occupational Choice," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 85(1), pages 511-557.
    19. By Louis Kaplow, 2012. "Optimal Control Of Externalities In The Presence Of Income Taxation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(2), pages 487-509, May.
    20. M. Adam & O. Bonnet & E. Fize & T. Loisel & M. Rault & L. Wilner, 2023. "How does fuel demand respond to price changes? Quasi-experimental evidence based on high-frequency data," Documents de Travail de l'Insee - INSEE Working Papers 2023-17, Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2377. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Brittany Ladd (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cowleus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.