IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cwl/cwldpp/1775.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Mechanism Design with Limited Information: The Case of Nonlinear Pricing

Author

Listed:

Abstract

We analyze the canonical nonlinear pricing model with limited information. A seller offers a menu with a finite number of choices to a continuum of buyers with a continuum of possible valuations. By revealing an underlying connection to quantization theory, we derive the optimal finite menu for the socially efficient and the revenue-maximizing mechanism. In both cases, we provide an estimate of the loss resulting from the usage of a finite n-class menu. We show that the losses converge to zero at a rate proportional to 1/n^2 as n becomes large.

Suggested Citation

  • Dirk Bergemann & Ji Shen & Yun Xu & Edmund M. Yeh, 2010. "Mechanism Design with Limited Information: The Case of Nonlinear Pricing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1775, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1775
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d17/d1775.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Ji Shen & Yun Xu & Edmund M. Yeh, 2012. "Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design with Limited Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1859, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mechanism design; Limited information; Nonlinear pricing; Quantization; Lloyd-max optimality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1775. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Brittany Ladd (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cowleus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.