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Worker Trust, System Vulnerability, and the Performance of Work Groups

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  • Schotter, A.

Abstract

What we find is that teh match between vulnerability and trust is a key ingredient into what makes a group of workers work well together along with the type of coordination problem that is created by the equilibrium of the incentive scheme.

Suggested Citation

  • Schotter, A., 1996. "Worker Trust, System Vulnerability, and the Performance of Work Groups," Working Papers 96-32, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  • Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:96-32
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    File URL: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9383/RR96-32.PDF
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    GAME THEORY;

    JEL classification:

    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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    1. Industrial Sociology (FCT-UNL)

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