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Equilibrium Wage and Dismissal Processes

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  • Flinn, C.J.

Abstract

The author develops and estimates an equilibrium model of the labor market in which inefficient employees are systematically eliminated from the sector of the market characterized by asymmetric information and moral hazard. Systematic selection on the distribution of productivity characteristics produces wage sequences which are increasing in tenure for employees never previously terminated even in the absence of long-term contracting between employees and individual firms. The author provides sufficient conditions for there to exist an unique termination-contract type equilibrium and he estimates the equilibrium model using micro-level data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth panel.
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Suggested Citation

  • Flinn, C.J., 1993. "Equilibrium Wage and Dismissal Processes," Working Papers 93-38, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:93-38
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    Cited by:

    1. Christopher J. Flinn, 2002. "Interpreting Minimum Wage Effects on Wage Distributions : A Cautionary Tale," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 67-68, pages 309-355.
    2. Michael P. Keane & Robert M. Sauer, 2010. "A Computationally Practical Simulation Estimation Algorithm For Dynamic Panel Data Models With Unobserved Endogenous State Variables," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(4), pages 925-958, November.
    3. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2291-2372 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Demiralp, Berna, 2011. "Occupational self-selection in a labor market with moral hazard," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 497-519, May.
    5. Sauer, Robert & Keane, Michael P., 2007. "A computationally practical simulation estimation algorithm for dynamic panel data models with unobserved endogenous state variables," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0705, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    6. Flinn, Christopher, 2003. "Minimum Wage Effects on Labor Market Outcomes under Search with Bargaining," IZA Discussion Papers 949, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Ziesemer, Thomas, 2001. "Contract Prolongation In Innovation Production As A Principal-Agent Problem With Moral Hazard," Research Memorandum 036, Maastricht University, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    wages ; evaluation;

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