Optimal Debt Exchange Offers
This paper examines the pricing and efficiency implications of debt exchange offers. The continuous-time model employed yields simple asset pricing formulae as well as closed-form solutions for the parameters characterising optimal debt exchanges offers. Polar cases are examined in which the debt is either held by a single bank or by many bond-holders, that is respectively private or public debt. A comparative analysis of the efficiency properties of each form of debt yields the interesting finding that under the often criticised exit-consent provision, optimal public debt exchange offers are ex-ante the most efficient.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||01 May 1995|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)|
Fax: +32 10473945
Web page: https://uclouvain.be/en/research-institutes/immaq/ires
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:1995022. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anne DAVISTER-LOGIST)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.