Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners
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Other versions of this item:
- Marco Marinucci, 2009. "Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 97(2), pages 141-163, June.
- Marinucci, Marco, 2008. "Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners," MPRA Paper 8985, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Marinucci, Marco, 2008. "Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners," MPRA Paper 9058, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- MARINUCCI, Marco, 2009. "Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2137, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- MARINUCCI, Marco, 2008. "Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2008023, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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Cited by:
- Wang, Susheng & Zhu, Tian, 2016. "Optimality of the 51:49 equity structure," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 270-273.
- Hiroshi Osano, 2011. "Partial Ownership and Strategic Alliances with Reallocation of Corporate Resources," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(2), pages 202-223, June.
- ROELS, Guillaume & CHEVALIER, Philippe & WEI, Ying, 2012. "United we stand? Coordinating capacity investment and allocation in joint ventures," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2012045, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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Keywords
; ; ; ;JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2008-11-11 (Contract Theory and Applications)
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