Information disclosure in optimal auctions
A celebrated result in auction theory is that the optimal reserve price in the standard private value setting does not depend on the number of bidders. We modify the framework by considering that the seller controls the accuracy with which bidders learn their valuations, and show that in such a case, the greater the number of bidders the more restrictive the reserve price. We also show that the auctioneer provides more information when using an optimal auction mechanism than when the object is always sold.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2014|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://portal.uc3m.es/portal/page/portal/indem|
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