Information disclosure in optimal auctions
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- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-03-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2014-03-22 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2014-03-22 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2014-03-22 (Microeconomics)
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