The Welfare Implications of Costly Information Provision
We study information acquisition in a framework characterized by strategic complementarity or substitutability. Agents’ actions are based on costly public and private signals, the precisions of which are set by a policy maker and by private agents, respectively. The policy maker – acting as a von Stackelberg leader – takes into account that an increase in the precision of public information reduces the incentives for private information acquisition. The precisions of both the public and private information available to each agent are shown to depend crucially on the degree of strategic complementarity or substitutability. We explore the welfare and policy implications of our results in economies with beauty contests, price setting complementarities, and negative externalities entailing strategic substitutability.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.unicatt.it/Istituti/EconomiaFinanza|
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