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Endogénéisation des externalités de recherche: le rôle de la capacité d'émission des connaissances



Cette contribution s'intéresse à la capacité d'émission des connaissances des firmes. En effet, les externalités de connaissance, considérées comme exogènes par la théorie classique, sont en fait maîtrisables par les firmes. Or ces dernières loin de vouloir toujours garder le secret choisissent parfois de révéler à leurs concurrents certaines de leurs connaissances les plus importantes. Après avoir passé en revue plusieurs explications de telles pratiques, il est suggéré que la diffusion volontaire de connaissance, en permettant à l'émetteur de se signaler, est un moyen d'intégrer des réseaux d'innovation, ceci dans le but de profiter des connaissances qui circulent à l'intérieur de ces réseaux. En effet, l'accès à ce type de réseau de production de connaissance engendre d'importants coûts provenant notamment des problèmes de localisation des partenaires potentiels et des asymétries d'information. De ce fait, l'émission volontaire de connaissance facilite, selon nous, l'accès à ces réseaux d'innovation et permet ainsi à l'émetteur d'accroître son stock de connaissances absorbables. This paper is an introduction to what we call the firm's knowledge emission capability. We first point out the main differences between the traditional view of knowledge spillovers and a more evolutionary view, where spillovers are considered as endogenous. Firms have the ability to hold their new knowledge secret during very long spells of time. However, they often decide to freely reveal some parts of this knowledge. Our goal is first to explain the motivation of such apparently non rational behavior. Then we focus on a more precise point, that is: Knowledge revealing as a strategy to join innovation networks. Indeed, important technological knowledge usually flows within networks and if outsiders want to have an access to this knowledge, they must enter the network. Thus, in order to do so, they may be induced to reveal some of their knowledge to send a signal to the insiders.

Suggested Citation

  • Julien Pénin, 2002. "Endogénéisation des externalités de recherche: le rôle de la capacité d'émission des connaissances," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 20-13, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
  • Handle: RePEc:cre:uqamwp:20-13

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Décamps, Jean-Paul & Mariotti, Thomas, 2000. "Irreversible Investment and Learning Externalities," IDEI Working Papers 97, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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    8. Harris, Christopher J & Vickers, John S, 1985. "Patent Races and the Persistence of Monopoly," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(4), pages 461-481, June.
    9. Turalay Kenc & William Perraudin, 1996. "Demography, Pensions and Welfare: Fertility Shocks and the Finnish Economy," Discussion Papers 131, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT).
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    Cited by:

    1. Julien PENIN, 2005. "Open knowledge disclosure, incomplete information and collective innovations," Working Papers of BETA 2005-10, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    2. Penin, Julien, 2005. "Patents versus ex post rewards: A new look," Research Policy, Elsevier, pages 641-656.

    More about this item


    Externalités de connaissance; émission volontaire; réseau d'innovation; coopération en R&D - knowledge spillovers; voluntary emission; innovation network; R&D cooperation;

    JEL classification:

    • L0 - Industrial Organization - - General

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