Environmental Innovation Policy and International Competition
We consider one polluting industry in an open economy. The national government implements a policy of industrial pollution control by inducing appropriate technological innovations to reduce toxic emissions. The emission-reducing innovations are developed through firm-specific costly investments. Under different hypotheses on market structure (perfect competition, Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly) international competition forces the national government to subsidize innovation. The appropriate subsidy scheme varies according to market structure and to the information available to the government. If information is asymmetric, the subsidy must include an information premium to separate different types of firms.
|Date of creation:||Apr 1991|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
|Order Information:|| Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Baron, David P., 1985. "Regulation of prices and pollution under incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 211-231, November.
- Picard Pierre, 1986.
"On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection,"
CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange)
- Picard, Pierre, 1987. "On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 305-331, August.
- Downing, Paul B. & White, Lawrence J., 1986. "Innovation in pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 18-29, March.
- Milliman, Scott R. & Prince, Raymond, 1989. "Firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 247-265, November.
- Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 329-369, December.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1988.
"The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts,"
Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1153-75, September.
- Jean Tirole & Jean-Jaques Laffont, 1985.
"Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms,"
368, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:525. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask to update the entry or send us the correct address
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.