Exchange Rate Arrangements between the Ins and the Outs
This paper analyses several issues. First, it describes the main features of ERM II and compares them with those of ERM I as it evolved during the 1980s and 1990s. Second, it analyses whether, and under what conditions, ERM II will be more successful than its predecessor in avoiding disruptive speculative crises. To do so, it uses both new theoretical insights about the factors that affect the occurrence of speculative crises and an historical analysis of the turbulence within ERM I.
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|Date of creation:||May 1997|
|Date of revision:|
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