IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/14359.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Elusive Gains from Nationally-Oriented Monetary Policy

Author

Listed:
  • Corsetti, Giancarlo
  • Bodenstein, Martin
  • Guerrieri, Luca

Abstract

The consensus in the recent literature is that the gains from international monetary cooperation are negligible, and so are the costs of a breakdown in cooperation. However, when assessed conditionally on empirically-relevant dynamic developments of the economy, the welfare cost of moving away from regimes of explicit or implicit cooperation may rise to multiple times the cost of economic fluctuations. In economies with incomplete markets, the incentives to act non-cooperatively are driven by the emergence of global imbalances, i.e., large net-foreign-asset positions; and, in economies with complete markets, by divergent real wages.

Suggested Citation

  • Corsetti, Giancarlo & Bodenstein, Martin & Guerrieri, Luca, 2020. "The Elusive Gains from Nationally-Oriented Monetary Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 14359, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14359
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP14359
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Luca Fornaro & Federica Romei, 2022. "Monetary policy during unbalanced global recoveries," Economics Working Papers 1814, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    2. Hefeker, Carsten, 2022. "Policy coordination under model disagreement and asymmetric shocks," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary policy cooperation; Global imbalances; Open-loop nash games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14359. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.