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Corruption et allocation optimale de l'investissement public

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  • DE LA CROIX, David
  • DELAVALLADE, Clara

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze one channel through which corruption hampers growth: public investment can be distorted in favour of specific types of spending for which rent-seeking is easier and better concealed. To study this distortion, we propose an optimal growth model where a planner chooses the composition of public spending subject to an incentive constraint reflecting households’ choice between productive activity and rent-seeking. We test the implications of the model on a panel of countries estimating a system of equations with instrumental variables. Countries with a failing legal system have higher levels of corruption, spend relatively more in physical capital than in education and health, and they grow slower, in particular if the political power is highly concentrated. Classification JEL : O41, H50, D73.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • DE LA CROIX, David & DELAVALLADE, Clara, 2007. "Corruption et allocation optimale de l'investissement public," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1990, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1990
    Note: In : Révue économique, 58(3), 637-648, 2007
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    Cited by:

    1. Simplice Asongu & Oasis Kodila-Tedika, 2016. "Fighting African conflicts and crimes: which governance tools matter?," International Journal of Social Economics, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 43(5), pages 466-485, May.
    2. d’Agostino, Giorgio & Dunne, J. Paul & Pieroni, Luca, 2016. "Government Spending, Corruption and Economic Growth," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 190-205.
    3. Dridi, Mohamed, 2013. "Corruption and Economic Growth: The Transmission Channels," MPRA Paper 47873, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Simplice Asongu & Mohamed Jellal, 2014. "Foreign aid, investment and fiscal policy behavior: theory and empirical evidence," Working Papers 14/030, African Governance and Development Institute..
    5. Simplice Asongu & Mohamed Jellal, 2016. "Foreign Aid Fiscal Policy: Theory and Evidence," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 58(2), pages 279-314, June.
    6. Asongu, Simplice A & Jellal, Mohamed, 2014. "International aid, corruption and fiscal policy behavior," MPRA Paper 58750, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Asongu, Simplice A. & Kodila-Tedika, Oasis, 2013. "Crime and conflicts in Africa: consequences of corruption?," European Economic Letters, European Economics Letters Group, vol. 2(2), pages 50-55.
    8. Mohamed Dridi, 2014. "Corruption and Education: Empirical Evidence," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 4(3), pages 476-493.
    9. Simplice A Asongu, 2015. "A Good Turn Deserves Another: Political Stability, Corruption and Corruption-Control," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(4), pages 2037-2048.
    10. Asongu, Simplice & Jellal, Mohamed, 2014. "International aid corruption and fiscal behavior policy," MPRA Paper 57192, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Kodila Tedika, Oasis, 2012. "Consequences De La Corruption : Panorama Empirique
      [Consequences of Corruption : Empirical survey]
      ," MPRA Paper 41482, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • O41 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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