Local public funding of higher education when skilled labor is mobile
Inter-jurisdictional labor mobility when public funding of higher education is sub-federal leads to a disparity between the centralized output-maximizing allocation of resources to education and decentralized equilibria. We show that when local governments choose their level of spending on higher education at a Nash equilibrium, the size and direction of this disparity depend strongly on the political balance of forces at the sub-federal level. The more common case of under-investment can be alleviated through inter-jurisdictional subsidies of local education expenditures based on net migration flows.
|Date of creation:||01 Apr 1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)|
Fax: +32 10474304
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1997024. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.