Some Worrying Theoretical Consequences Of The Non-Linear Relationship Between The Economic Size Of Preferential Trade Agreements And Welfare
This paper demonstrates that in the standard Viner-Lipsey customs unions analysis, there is a non-linear relationship between welfare and the economic size of preferential trade agreements. It is concluded that signing preferential trade agreements with countries that have a large trade potential is likely to improve welfare, but that a minimum economic size threshold may be required for such outcome. Otherwise, preferential trade agreements may reduce welfare. The paper also demonstrates that within that framework, the lower the trade barriers towards non-member countries, the greater the economic size that may be required for preferential trade agreements to be welfare improving. This theoretical paper suggests that if small countries follow preferential trade agreement strategies such as those applied by the European Union, and more recently by the United States, Mexico and Chile, they should do so with care, clear objectives and national commitment.
|Date of creation:||01 Feb 2004|
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- Baldwin, Richard E, 1992.
"Measurable Dynamic Gains from Trade,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(1), pages 162-174, February.
- Richard Baldwin, 1989. "Measureable Dynamic Gains from Trade," NBER Working Papers 3147, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Baldwin, Richard, 1990. "Measurable Dynamic Gains from Trade," Working Paper Series 270, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Corden, W M, 1972. "Economies of Scale and Customs Union Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(3), pages 465-475, May-June.
- Harry G. Johnson, 1965. "An Economic Theory of Protectionism, Tariff Bargaining, and the Formation of Customs Unions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 256-256. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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