Auditing and Bank Capital Regulation
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Cited by:
- Marshall, David A. & Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2006.
"State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 2015-2049, November.
- David A. Marshall & Edward Simpson Prescott, 2002. "State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved action and unobserved characteristics," Working Paper Series WP-02-24, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Edward Simpson Prescott, 2004. "State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics," Working Paper 04-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Thomas M. Eisenbach & David O. Lucca & Robert M. Townsend, 2022.
"Resource Allocation in Bank Supervision: Trade‐Offs and Outcomes,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(3), pages 1685-1736, June.
- Thomas M. Eisenbach & David O. Lucca & Robert M. Townsend, 2016. "Resource Allocation in Bank Supervision: Trade-offs and Outcomes," Staff Reports 769, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham & Beverly Hirtle & David O. Lucca, 2016. "Parsing the content of bank supervision," Staff Reports 770, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Blum, Jürg M., 2008.
"Why 'Basel II' may need a leverage ratio restriction,"
Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(8), pages 1699-1707, August.
- Jürg M. Blum, 2007. "Why 'Basel II' May Need a Leverage Ratio Restriction," Working Papers 2007-04, Swiss National Bank.
- Thomas M. Eisenbach & David O. Lucca & Robert M. Townsend, 2016. "The Economics of Bank Supervision," NBER Working Papers 22201, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Delis, Manthos D & Staikouras, Panagiotis, 2009. "On-site audits, sanctions, and bank risk-taking: An empirical overture towards a novel regulatory and supervisory philosophy," MPRA Paper 16836, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Yaron Leitner & Bilge Yilmaz, 2016. "Regulating A Model," Working Papers 16-31, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
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