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Political Activism and Market Power

Author

Listed:
  • Elia Ferracuti

    (Duke University - Fuqua School of Business)

  • Roni Michaely

    (University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute (GFRI); Swiss Finance Institute)

  • Laura Wellman

    (Pennsylvania State University)

Abstract

Using novel data on firms’ government relations staff, and two distinct empirical settings, we show that political activism enables firms to grow their market power. The documented increases in profit margins and market share persist for up to two years, and are concentrated among large politically active firms. We also utilize firms’ mandatory lobbying disclosures to identify a broad set of legislative actions lobbied for by sample firms, and analyze their strategic actions around those events. Taken together, our results show that politically active firms gain a competitive advantage through strategically timed investments when policy uncertainty is high.

Suggested Citation

  • Elia Ferracuti & Roni Michaely & Laura Wellman, 2020. "Political Activism and Market Power," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 20-60, Swiss Finance Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp2060
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    File URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3585372
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    Cited by:

    1. Bae, Kee-Hong & Bailey, Warren & Kang, Jisok, 2021. "Why is stock market concentration bad for the economy?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(2), pages 436-459.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Market Power; Political Activism; Policy Uncertainty; Competition; Profitability; Profit Margins; Market Share; Capital Investment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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