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Executive Compensation and Stock Options: An Inconvenient Truth

Author

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  • Jean-Pierre Danthine

    (Swiss Finance Institute, University of Lausanne and CEPR)

  • John B. Donaldson

    (Columbia University)

Abstract

We reexamine the issue of executive compensation within a gen- eral equilibrium production context. Intertemporal optimality places strong restrictions on the form of a representative manager's compen- sation contract, restrictions that appear to be incompatible with the fact that the bulk of many high-proffile managers' compensation is in the form of various options and option-like rewards. We therefore measure the extent to which a convex contract alone can induce the manager to adopt near-optimal investment and hiring decisions. To ask this question is essentially to ask if such contracts can effectively align the stochastic discount factor of the manager with that of the shareholder-workers. We detail exact circumstances under which this alignment is possible and when it is not.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Pierre Danthine & John B. Donaldson, 2008. "Executive Compensation and Stock Options: An Inconvenient Truth," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 08-13, Swiss Finance Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp0813
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    Keywords

    corporate governance; optimal contracting; business cycles;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy

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