Executive Compensation and Stock Options: An Inconvenient Truth
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Jean-Pierre Danthine & John B. Donaldson, 2008. "Executive Compensation and Stock Options: An Inconvenient Truth," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 08-13, Swiss Finance Institute.
More about this item
Keywordsbusiness cycles; convex contracts; corporate governance; executive compensation; optimal contracting; stock options;
- E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-07-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2008-07-05 (Business Economics)
- NEP-DGE-2008-07-05 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-MAC-2008-07-05 (Macroeconomics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6890. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .