IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_5575.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Matching on Bipartite Graphs

Author

Listed:
  • Hans Gersbach
  • Hans Haller

Abstract

We study stable matchings on exogenously given or endogenously formed bipartite graphs that reflect constraints on matching. The effects of a change of the exogenously given graph (constraints) are investigated. Specifically, we examine to what extent individuals gain or lose from relaxing restrictions on matching. Sabotage of particular matches or location choice can render certain matches infeasible and, therefore, lead to endogenous constraints.

Suggested Citation

  • Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2015. "Matching on Bipartite Graphs," CESifo Working Paper Series 5575, CESifo Group Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5575
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp5575.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Subhadip Chakrabarti & Hans Haller, 2011. "An Analysis Of Advertising Wars," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 79(1), pages 100-124, January.
    2. John William Hatfield & Paul R. Milgrom, 2005. "Matching with Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 913-935, September.
    3. Gabrielle Demange & David Gale & Marilda Sotomayor, 1987. "A Further Note on the Stable Matching Problem," Post-Print halshs-00670980, HAL.
    4. Gersbach, Hans & Schmutzler, Armin, 2014. "Does globalization create superstars? A simple theory of managerial wages," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 34-51.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    matching theory; networks; graphs;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5575. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Klaus Wohlrabe). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/cesifde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.