IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Regulatory Competition Versus Harmonisation in European Company Law

Listed author(s):
  • Simon Deakin
Registered author(s):

    The harmonisation of company law in Europe has done little to remove diversity in the legal systems of the member states. The impact of directives has been significant in certain areas, such as basic accounting standards and the rules of capital maintenance. Nevertheless, the continuing divergence between 'insider' systems, which place a strong emphasis on stakeholder forms of representation, and 'outsider' systems, which stress liquid stock markets and the protection of shareholder interests, is reflected in the failure of the member states to reach agreement on a number of key proposals, in particular the model constitution for transnational enterprises which is contained in the draft European Company Statute. At the same time, the prospects of US-style regulatory competition emerging in the near future are remote, since this would also require harmonisation, in this case of the rules of conflict of laws. However, diversity is in many ways a strength of the European company law systems, which, paradoxically, 'reflexive' harmonisation has sought to preserve while also encouraging innovation in forms of self-regulation in the corporate and financial spheres. Co-evolution based on diversity at the level of national legal systems, coupled with encouragement from transnational norms for devolved solutions, is a more likely path for European company law than the type of convergence around a single, dominant regime which appears to characterise the Delaware effect in the US context.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge in its series Working Papers with number wp163.

    in new window

    Date of creation: Mar 2000
    Handle: RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp163
    Note: PRO-2
    Contact details of provider: Web page:

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp163. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ruth Newman and Georgie Cohen)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.