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Fiscal federalism in crisis- lessons for Europe from the US

Author

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  • Zsolt Darvas

Abstract

The euro area is facing crisis, while the US is not, though the overall fiscal situation and outlook is better in the euro area than in the US, and though the US faces serious state-level fiscal crises. The focus on the euro area is a consequence of the Greek solvency problem, fear of contagion, the ambiguous policy response and institutional deficiencies. A higher level of fiscal federalism would strengthen the...

Suggested Citation

  • Zsolt Darvas, 2010. "Fiscal federalism in crisis- lessons for Europe from the US," Bruegel Policy Contributions 420, Bruegel.
    • Handle: RePEc:bre:polcon:420
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bartha Attila, 2013. "Governance, Culture And Democracy: Institutions And Economic Development Of Eu Member States," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1(1), pages 205-214, July.
    2. Armin Steinbach, 2015. "The Mutualization of Sovereign Debt: Comparing the American Past and the European Present," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(5), pages 1110-1125, September.
    3. Armin Steinbach, 2015. "The Mutualisation of Sovereign Debt: Comparing the American Past and the European Present," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics 2015_02, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics.
    4. Heinz Handler, 2013. "The Eurozone: Piecemeal Approach to an Optimum Currency Area," WIFO Working Papers 446, WIFO.
    5. Nils aus dem Moore, 2010. "Eine Wirtschaftsregierung für Europa? – Die EU braucht bessere governance, aber kein gouvernement économique," RWI Positionen, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, pages 24, December.
    6. aus dem Moore, Nils, 2010. "Eine Wirtschaftsregierung für Europa? Die EU braucht bessere governance, aber kein gouvernement économique," RWI Positionen 41, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung.
    7. Zsolt Darvas, 2012. "The euro crisis- ten roots, but fewer solutions," Bruegel Policy Contributions 755, Bruegel.
    8. Fruzsina Siger, 2011. "Why do we compare the EU with the USA all the time?," IWE Working Papers 196, Institute for World Economics - Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    9. Jinill Kim & Sunghyun Kim, 2017. "How much to share: Welfare effects of fiscal transfers," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(3), pages 636-659, August.
    10. Hyungon Kim & Chang Kwon, 2015. "The Effects of Fiscal Consolidation and Welfare Composition of Spending on Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from US Gubernatorial Elections between 1978 and 2006," New Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(2), pages 228-253, April.
    11. Lannoo, Karel, 2011. "EU Federalism in Crisis," CEPS Papers 6498, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    12. Costain, James & de Blas, Beatriz, 2012. "The role of fiscal delegation in a monetary union: a survey of the political economy issues," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2012/11, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management
    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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