Monitoring Team Production by Design
This work addresses the optimal design of the monitoring technology for a team when collective liability can not form. It shows that the principal’s optimal design choice is then to concentrate monitoring on the less productive agent in a team. By controlling the less productive agent she fully discipline the more productive. This result helps in studying the interplay between the institutional set-up and the technological capabilities of teams
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- Shingo Ishiguro & Hideshi Itoh, 2001.
"Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 68(1), pages 1-20.
- Ishiguro, S. & Itoh, H., 1998. "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents," ISER Discussion Paper 0471, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
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