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The effect of personal contracts in public administration in Israel on length of service


  • Noam Michelson

    () (Bank of Israel)


Personal employment contracts for employees in professional positions in public administration in Israel create a more flexible employment format than that in collective agreements, with a higher level of pay than that in the case of collective wage agreements. Thus, personal contracts, whether used to keep excellent employees or used to afford greater managerial flexibility, are likely to affect the length of service of employees with such contracts. This study examines the effect of personal contracts on the length of service, and the actual difference in wage levels between those with personal contracts as opposed to those covered by collective agreements. The main finding is that the probability of leaving the job is higher among those who switched to personal contracts, but this is not a uniform result: in the first two years after the move to a personal contract the probability of leaving is lower than that of employees under collective agreements, but thereafter the situation is reversed, and those with personal contracts are more likely to leave.

Suggested Citation

  • Noam Michelson, 2012. "The effect of personal contracts in public administration in Israel on length of service," Bank of Israel Working Papers 2012.02, Bank of Israel.
  • Handle: RePEc:boi:wpaper:2012.02

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