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Aggregating Wrong Preferences

Author

Listed:
  • Uzi Segal

    (Boston College)

  • Zhuzhu Zhou

    (Xiamen University)

Abstract

In a social choice setting, individuals may be unwilling to aggregate their preferences with what they regard as wrong preferences held by others because they lead to outcomes that harm themselves, harm others, are socially inefficient, or are morally unacceptable. People may still be willing to compromise with those who believe that although such preferences are wrong, society should nonetheless accept them. We offer two methods of two-level aggre- gation for such situations. In the first method, each member of society first aggregates the “corrected” individual preferences, and society then aggregates these aggregated views. In the second method, for each person, society first aggregates everyone’s views about that person’s preferences, and then aggregates the resulting individual “corrected” preferences. If these two methods yield the same social ranking, then the aggregation rule must be the sum of functions of the corrected utilities.

Suggested Citation

  • Uzi Segal & Zhuzhu Zhou, 2026. "Aggregating Wrong Preferences," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1108, Boston College Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:1108
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    4. Mongin, Philippe, 2016. "Spurious Unanimity And The Pareto Principle," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(3), pages 511-532, November.
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    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General

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