Vertical unbundling, the coordination of investment, and network pricing
This paper addresses the investment coordination problem in a vertically separated electricity supply industry in the absence of locational pricing. In an electricity system, investments in network and power plants need to be coordinated. Unbundling eliminates firm-internal coordination. Information exchange might restore coordination if communication is truthful. Based on model results we analyse whether cheap talk of generator investors would be credible and hence informative for network investment decisions. We show that due to perverse incentives, this is not generally the case. We propose cost-reflective, locational network pricing as a coordination device to internalize the incentive problem.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, 16(5), 2015, pp. 378-403|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://b-e-r.user.jacobs-university.de/|
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