State Building and Social Control
Author
Abstract
A modicum of homogeneity of social norms is deemed valuable by societies, and social control is a way to achieve it. In this paper, we posit an economy populated by masses and elites, whereby the social norms of the former affect the welfare of the latter group. Consequently, the elites may exercise social control to induce the masses to embrace norms aligned with their own preferences. Our analysis reveals, in particular, that social control may go hand in hand with the prevalence of mass education, which induces homogeneity of norms. This, in turn, is argued to be consistent with historical evidence on the emergence of public schooling.
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Chong, Alberto & Gradstein, Mark, 2025. "State building and social control," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
More about this item
JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
- I25 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Education and Economic Development
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper2503. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your pro
Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ays/ispwps/paper2503.html