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Arctic Auctions, Linear Fisher Markets, and Rational Convex Programs

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  • Vijay V. Vazirani

Abstract

This paper unifies two foundational constructs from economics and algorithmic game theory, the Arctic Auction and the linear Fisher market, to address the efficient allocation of differentiated goods in complex markets. Our main contributions are showing that an equilibrium for the Arctic Auction is captured by a Rational Convex Program, and deriving the first combinatorial polynomial-time algorithm for computing Arctic Auction equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Vijay V. Vazirani, 2025. "Arctic Auctions, Linear Fisher Markets, and Rational Convex Programs," Papers 2511.21637, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2511.21637
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gagan Goel & Vijay V. Vazirani, 2011. "A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a Rational Convex Program for It," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 36(4), pages 762-782, November.
    2. Devanur, Nikhil R. & Garg, Jugal & Végh, László A., 2016. "A rational convex program for linear Arrow-Debreu markets," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 69224, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Hylland, Aanund & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1979. "The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(2), pages 293-314, April.
    4. Vijay V. Vazirani, 2010. "Spending Constraint Utilities with Applications to the Adwords Market," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 35(2), pages 458-478, May.
    5. Paul Klemperer, 2010. "The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(2-3), pages 526-536, 04-05.
    6. Jain, Kamal & Vazirani, Vijay V., 2010. "Eisenberg-Gale markets: Algorithms and game-theoretic properties," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 84-106, September.
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