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Dynamic Non-Bayesian Persuasion

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  • Masanori Kobayashi

Abstract

If a sender in a persuasion game can use a sequence of experiments rather than a single experiment, does this change the sender's value? We show that the sender can benefit more from dynamic persuasion than from static persuasion when the receiver is not Bayesian. Our main result shows that, under mild regularity conditions, divisibility, introduced in Cripps (2018), characterizes the receiver's updating rules under which the sender is indifferent between static and dynamic persuasion in any environment. Consequently, restricting attention to static persuasion is without loss precisely under divisible updating rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Masanori Kobayashi, 2025. "Dynamic Non-Bayesian Persuasion," Papers 2508.12328, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2026.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2508.12328
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    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2508.12328
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Yeon-Koo Che & Kyungmin Kim & Konrad Mierendorff, 2023. "Keeping the Listener Engaged: A Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(7), pages 1797-1844.
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    Cited by:

    1. Frank Yang & Kai Hao Yang, 2026. "Stochastic Optimization and Coupling," Papers 2603.11448, arXiv.org.

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