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A Concavification Approach to Ambiguous Persuasion

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  • Xiaoyu Cheng

Abstract

This note shows that the value of ambiguous persuasion characterized in Beauchene, Li and Li(2019) can be given by a concavification program as in Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011). In addition, it implies that an ambiguous persuasion game can be equivalently formalized as a Bayesian persuasion game by distorting the utility functions. This result is obtained under a novel construction of ambiguous persuasion.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiaoyu Cheng, 2021. "A Concavification Approach to Ambiguous Persuasion," Papers 2106.11270, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2021.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2106.11270
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2011. "Bayesian Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2590-2615, October.
    2. Cesaltina Pacheco Pires, 2002. "A Rule For Updating Ambiguous Beliefs," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 137-152, September.
    3. Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April.
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