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Pollution permits, Strategic Trading and Dynamic Technology Adoption

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  • Santiago Moreno-Bromberg
  • Luca Taschini

Abstract

This paper analyzes the dynamic incentives for technology adoption under a transferable permits system, which allows for strategic trading on the permit market. Initially, firms can invest both in low-emitting production technologies and trade permits. In the model, technology adoption and allowance price are generated endogenously and are inter-dependent. It is shown that the non-cooperative permit trading game possesses a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, where the allowance value reflects the level of uncovered pollution (demand), the level of unused allowances (supply), and the technological status. These conditions are also satisfied when a price support instrument, which is contingent on the adoption of the new technology, is introduced. Numerical investigation confirms that this policy generates a floating price floor for the allowances, and it restores the dynamic incentives to invest. Given that this policy comes at a cost, a criterion for the selection of a self-financing policy (based on convex risk measures) is proposed and implemented.

Suggested Citation

  • Santiago Moreno-Bromberg & Luca Taschini, 2011. "Pollution permits, Strategic Trading and Dynamic Technology Adoption," Papers 1103.2914, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1103.2914
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    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics

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