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Participant Bidding Enhances Cost Effectiveness

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  • Johansson, Robert C.

Abstract

A multitude of design decisions influence the performance of voluntary conservation programs. This Economic Brief is one of a set of five exploring the implications of decisions policymakers and program managers must make about who is eligible to receive payments, how much can be received, for what action, and the means by which applicants are selected. The particular issue examined here is the potential benefits of allowing farmers to "bid" for the activity they will undertake and the level of payment they would receive for it.

Suggested Citation

  • Johansson, Robert C., 2006. "Participant Bidding Enhances Cost Effectiveness," Economic Brief 34085, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:uerseb:34085
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.34085
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    File URL: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/34085/files/eb060003.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Dobbs, Thomas L., 2006. "Working Lands Agri-environmental Policy Options and Issues for the Next United States Farm Bill," Staff Papers 060003, South Dakota State University, Department of Economics.
    2. Hellerstein, Daniel & Higgins, Nathaniel, 2010. "The Effective Use of Limited Information: Do Bid Maximums Reduce Procurement Cost in Asymmetric Auctions?," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 39(2), pages 288-304, April.
    3. Spinelli, Felix, 2011. "Pro’s and Con’s of a reverse-auction to evaluate conservation easements," 2011 Annual Meeting, July 24-26, 2011, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 103841, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    4. Schilizzi, Steven & Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe, 2009. "Predicting the performance of conservation tenders when information on bidders's costs is limited," 2009 Conference (53rd), February 11-13, 2009, Cairns, Australia 48171, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.

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