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Sequencing The Transition

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  • Newbery, David

Abstract

The inefficiency of Soviet-type economies results from its monopolized production structure which makes soft budget constraints almost inevitable, as enterprises have bargaining power and must face expropriative tax rates for macroeconomic stability. Systematic reform aims to improve incentives, and if this is to be achieved with macro-stability, enterprises must be demonopolized. Most sequencing issues resolve into three key concerns: ensuring or restoring macroeconomic stability, not ruling out options for subsequent reforms, specifically those intended to increase competition, and maintaining support for completing the reform process.

Suggested Citation

  • Newbery, David, 1991. "Sequencing The Transition," Institute for Policy Reform Working Paper Series 294672, Institute for Policy Reform.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:iprwps:294672
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.294672
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Newbery, David, 1991. "The Safety Net During Transformation: Hungary," Institute for Policy Reform Archive 294660, Institute for Policy Reform.
    2. Newbery, David M G, 1990. "Tax Reform, Trade Liberalisation and Industrial Restructuring in Hungary," CEPR Discussion Papers 371, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    3. Landesmann, Michael & Székely, Istvan P., 1991. "Industrial Restructuring and the Reorientation of Trade in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland," CEPR Discussion Papers 546, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
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    6. Newbery, David, 1991. "The Safety Net During Transformation: Hungary," Institute for Policy Reform Working Paper Series 294660, Institute for Policy Reform.
    7. Farrell, Joseph, 1987. "Information and the Coase Theorem," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 113-129, Fall.
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    9. Mr. Vito Tanzi, 1991. "Tax Reform in Economies in Transition: A Brief Introduction to the Main Issues," IMF Working Papers 1991/023, International Monetary Fund.
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