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Contract farming and smallholder incentives to produce high quality: experimental evidence from the Vietnamese dairy sector

Author

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  • Saenger, Christoph
  • Qaim, Matin
  • Torero, Maximo
  • Viceisza, Angelino

Abstract

In emerging markets for high-value food products in developing countries, processing companies search for efficient ways to source raw material of consistent quality. One widely embraced approach is contract farming. But relatively little is known about the appropriate design of contracts, especially in a small farm context. We use the example of the Vietnamese dairy sector to analyze the effectiveness of existing contracts between a processor and smallholder farmers in terms of incentivizing the production of high quality milk. A framed field experiment is conducted to evaluate the impact of two incentive instruments, a price penalty for low quality and a bonus for consistent high quality milk, on farmers’ investment in quality-improving inputs. Statistical analysis suggests that the penalty drives farmers into higher input use, resulting in better output quality. The bonus payment generates even higher quality milk. We also find that input choice levels depend on farmers’ socio-economic characteristics such as wealth, while individual risk preferences seem to be less important. Implications for the design of contracts with smallholders are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Saenger, Christoph & Qaim, Matin & Torero, Maximo & Viceisza, Angelino, 2012. "Contract farming and smallholder incentives to produce high quality: experimental evidence from the Vietnamese dairy sector," 2012 Conference, August 18-24, 2012, Foz do Iguacu, Brazil 126430, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:iaae12:126430
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Birthal, Pratap S. & Joshi, P. K. & Gulati, Ashok, 2005. "Vertical coordination in high-value commodities," MTID discussion papers 85, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    2. Johan F.M. Swinnen & Anneleen Vandeplas, 2010. "Market power and rents in global supply chains," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 41(s1), pages 109-120, November.
    3. Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 2008. "Men, Women and Risk Aversion: Experimental Evidence," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier.
    4. Alexander, Corinne E. & Goodhue, Rachael E. & Rausser, Gordon C., 2007. "Do Incentives For Quality Matter?," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 39(01), April.
    5. Marc F. Bellemare, 2010. "Agricultural extension and imperfect supervision in contract farming: evidence from Madagascar," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 41(6), pages 507-517, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Deininger, Klaus & Xia, Fang, 2016. "Quantifying Spillover Effects from Large Land-based Investment: The Case of Mozambique," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 227-241.
    2. Torero, Maximo & Viceisza, Angelino C.G., 2016. "Potential collusion and trust: Evidence from a field experiment in Vietnam," African Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, African Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 11(1), March.
    3. Kunte, Sebastian & Wollni, Meike & Keser, Claudia, 2014. "Making it personal: breach and private ordering in a contract farming experiment," Discussion Papers 186136, Georg-August-Universitaet Goettingen, GlobalFood, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development.
    4. Soullier, Guillaume & Moustier, Paule, 2016. "Do contracts increase farmers’ incomes and food security? Evidence from the rice value chain in Senegal," 149th Seminar, October 27-28, 2016, Rennes, France 244790, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    5. Deininger,Klaus W. & Xia,Fang & Mate,Aurelio & Payongayong,Ellen, 2015. "Quantifying spillover effects from large farm establishments : the case of Mozambique," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7466, The World Bank.
    6. Jan Fałkowski & Agata Malak-Rawlikowska & Dominika Milczarek-Andrzejewska, 2013. "Determinants and Consequences of Participating in a Restructured Supply Chain: the Experience of the Dairy Sector in Poland," Ekonomia journal, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw, vol. 34.
    7. Ali,Daniel Ayalew & Deininger,Klaus W. & Harris,Charles Anthony Philip, 2016. "Large farm establishment, smallholder productivity, labor market participation, and resilience : evidence from Ethiopia," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7576, The World Bank.
    8. Ochieng, Dennis O. & Veettil, Prakashan C. & Qaim, Matin, 2017. "Farmers’ preferences for supermarket contracts in Kenya," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 100-111.
    9. Saenger, Christoph & Torero, Maximo & Qaim, Matin, 2016. "Impact of third-party enforcement of contracts in agricultural markets—A field experiment in Vietnam," IFPRI book chapters,in: Innovation for inclusive value-chain development: Successes and challenges, chapter 11, pages 343-374 International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    10. Mahdi, Shireen, 2012. "Quality contingent contracts : evidence from Tanzania's coffee market," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6171, The World Bank.
    11. Rajendran, Srinivasulu & Afari-Sefa, Victor & Karanja, Daniel Kimani & Musebe, Richard & Romney, Dannie & Makaranga, Magesa A. & Samali, Silvest & Kessy, Radegunda Francis, 2016. "Farmer-Led Seed Enterprise Initiatives to Access Certified Seed for Traditional African Vegetables and its Effect on Incomes in Tanzania," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IFAMA), vol. 19(1).
    12. repec:spr:endesu:v:19:y:2017:i:6:d:10.1007_s10668-016-9854-z is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Abate, Gashaw T. & Bernard, Tanguy, 2017. "Farmers’ quality assessment of their crops and its impact on commercialization behavior: A field experiment in Ethiopia," IFPRI discussion papers 1624, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    14. Bernard, Tanguy & Hidrobo, Melissa & Le Port, Agnès & Rawat, Rahul, 2017. "Nutrition incentives in dairy contract farming in northern Senegal," IFPRI discussion papers 1629, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    15. Mailu, Stephen & Will, Margret & Mwanza, Rosemary & Nkanata, Kinyua & Mbugua, David, 2014. "Milk supply contracts and default incidence in Kenya," MPRA Paper 57381, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Apr 2014.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contract farming; incentives; risk; experimental economics; framed field experiment; dairy; Vietnam; developing countries; Agribusiness; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; International Development; Risk and Uncertainty;

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • Q12 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets

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